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INTRODUCTION
The dynamics of entrepreneurial activities and of the start-up firms that entrepreneurs bring to life has been a topic of interest to economic researchers for a number of years. Of course, in the end entrepreneurial success depends on the skills of the owner-managers and on the financial resources at their disposal (Becchetti and Trovato, 2002; Åstebro and Bernhardt, 2003; Hanley and Girma, 2006) . With regard to the financial aspects, most part of the existing research has focused on studying the efforts to grow and obtain resources in a long-run perspective (Petersen and Rajan (1994) , , Berger, Saunders, Scalise and Udell (1998) ). By contrast, there is relatively little systematic knowledge about the borrowing needs of firms shortly after they are founded.
In this paper we aim at filling this gap by considering the short-term loans that banks extend to newly founded firms. First, we re-examine the composition of debt, the determinants of bank loans and their share in the overall financial structure of young companies. Second, and in addition to standard determinants of credit such as size and profitability, we investigate the role of collateral, of bank-firm relationships, of sectorial differences, as well as the interaction among these variables. Specifically, we test the factors that influence the relative size of bank loans that young firms are able to obtain.
With this purpose in mind, we consider a sample of small Italian companies created between 1992 and 2004 and verify whether their behavior after birth is consistent with our conjectures on small-firm finance. In particular, in the next section we briefly survey the literature on bank lending to small firms. Sections 3 to 5 describe the small-business institutional environment in Italy, the sample of Italian newly-founded companies that form the object of our empirical investigation, the main variables taken into account in the analysis. In section 6 we present our empirical results about the determinants of capital structure. The traditional empirical model is extended in sections 7 and 8. Section 9 concludes and offers some suggestion for future research.
BANK LOANS TO SMALL FIRMS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
By and large, companies finance their activities from two main sources: equity and debt. 1 Equity consists of the funds invested by the owners. It is a permanent source of capital, in that there is no duty to pay it back or to remunerate it at an agreed-upon rate. It also plays a signaling role. Since asymmetric information is remarkably strong in the case of small firms, owners signal their confidence and -indirectly -the quality of their entrepreneurial endeavors by investing their wealth in their own firms. The strength and reliability of these signals, however, might not attract enough investors willing to risk their capital by becoming residual claimants. When this happens, borrowing becomes inevitable, as long as the lender is willing to take at least some risks.
Consistent with this intuition, argue that firms use different combinations of financing in different growth stages (this is the so-called life cycle theory of firms). When small and young, companies suffer from a high informational disadvantage, they
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The role of trade credit lies beyond the scope of these pages. Yet, although its importance is not denied, its role is ambiguous. For instance, Nilsen (2002) suggests that trade credit is a substitute for bank loans. Others, such as and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) find that they may be complements.
find it hard to obtain funds from external sources and rely on 'inside financing'. Later, when they have acquired a reputation, owners eventually turn to external sources. In these cases, they prefer debt to equity, so as not to dilute ownership and control (Myers, 1984) and tend to concentrate on short-term loans, less risky for the lender, and thus cheaper for the borrower (Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008) . However, lack of collateral or a measurable revenue streams sometimes preclude such firms from obtaining bank loans. Thus, equity-linked financing is often necessary.
The role of relationships
Given the role of information asymmetries, during the past decade the literature on bank lending has also emphasized the importance of bank-customer relationships and the use of collateral as ways of reducing lenders' mistrust. In this context, Rajan (1994, 1995) called attention to distinction between impersonal lending and relationship lending. The former identifies situations in which banks rely on the borrowers' balance sheets in order to assess creditworthiness. The latter applies when banks engage in acquiring additional information by interacting with their customers. 2 This is called, relationship lending.
The length of relationships between a young firm and its bank is related to the size of loan that it is able to obtain. The sign of the relationship (positive or negative) is based on the type of information that is revealed to the bank over time. The current literature supports a positive link between the length of relationship and loan size. Relationships benefit both parties. As the 2 See the important contributions by Black and Strahan (2002) , Berger and Udell (2002) , Bodenhorn (2003) , Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) , Hanley and Girma (2006) . assessment of risk becomes more reliable, the quality of the bank portfolio improves and the willingness to lend increases. Likewise, the length of the relationship reduces the likelihood of collateral requests for the establishment of credit lines. Thus, the need to offer collateral becomes less stringent and the cost of borrowing declines. Chakraborty and Hu (2006) documented reduced need for collateral and lower interest rate. These results were also confirmed by Elsas and Krahnen (2004) for Germany; by Peltoniemi (2004) for Finland; and by Scott and Dunkelberg (2003) for the US. Not surprisingly, small companies benefit from relationship banking more than large firms, 3 especially when firms do not produce information that can be processed in a standardized way.
Information problems and lending technology
The finance literature distinguishes between two ways (or two 'technologies') in which small businesses are financed by banks, depending on the type of information which they can provide. On one hand, there is a transaction -based lending and on the other relationship lending. The second technology is more common in the case of small businesses. In general, the academic literature views the "relationship lending" as more relevant to the relatively opaque firm that suffers from more intense asymmetric information. However, Berger and Udell (2006) claim that banks often lend to opaque small businesses using the transactionbased approach. Uchida Udell and Watanabe (2008), using data from Japan, found that there is a high degree of complementarily among these two approaches 4 . So, bank maybe using various 3 See Peterson and Rajan (1994) , as well as Craig and Hardee (2007) .
4
Uchida Udell and Watanabe (2008) using survey-macro data on Japanese SME's test the importance of various "lending technologies" and consider for lending technologies: "financial statement lending", "real estate lending", "fixed assets lending" and "relationship lending". lending "technologies" at the same time. In this study we adopt this approach and do not differentiate between the two technologies. Specifically, the two technologies co-exist. The lending bank would use hard information when available and supplement it with customerspecific information that is gathered through multiple interactions with the same customer over time and across products.
2.3
The role of collateral Thus, the presence of collateral affects company financing. Since it limits moral hazard and adverse selection, it contributes to reducing the assessment costs incurred by the lender. As noted by Riding and Haines (2001) and others, the use of costly collateral creates a signaling mechanism about the quality of the debt and encourages the borrower to operate efficiently. As a result, the amount of credit that the lender is willing to provide increases.
Using firm's responses to survey questions they analyze the determinants of each index and find that there is complementarily among the four "technologies".
BANKS AND SMALL BUSINESSES IN ITALY
Compared to many other Western countries, Italy exhibits a large share of the working population categorized as self-employed or as business owners. In Italy, small businesses represent some 95% of the total number of firms; they provide almost 47% of total employment and have a significant impact on the economic growth of the country (Istat, 2006) . Such firms, however, are not always high technology start-ups that need large amounts of financing from equity investors. Not surprisingly, lending to small business has thus been an important area of interest for both large and small banks.
Earlier research offered some explanations for this unusual situation. For example, some authors have mentioned the diminishing role of scale economies and the increasing role of nonstandardized production. Others have drawn attention to the tax benefits that accrue to autonomous workers and entrepreneurs. Rapiti (1997) Two other features deserve to be underscored. First, in Italy the average company interacts with one lead bank and 3.9 other banks at the same time (3.0 other banks in the case of companies employing less than 20 people according to Capitalia, 2005) . 5 Rajan and Winton (1995) argue that this might point to low risk, since one could figure out that the borrower passed several screenings successfully. From a different standpoint, however, one might also suggest that multiple lenders are evidence of high risk: so high, in fact, that each bank offers funds only as long as other banks are willing to share the risk. Second, Italian small companies are characterized by no sharp distinction between ownership and control. As noted by Bianco and Casavola (1999) , in most Italian companies ownership is highly concentrated. This may be both a blessing and a curse: it might constrain future expansion, as output growth often requires a significant amount of outside equity, which is unlikely to come from the founder's pockets;
but it might also contribute to reducing conflicts and internalizing the outcome of the decisionmaking process.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND VARIABLE DEFINITION
We use data collected through a survey conducted in three Northern-Italian regions in 2005-06.
It includes information about size and industry, as well as on equity and debt. In particular, the data on equity are broken up into owner's savings (including equity positions held by the owner's family) and external funding. For debt we have separate information about bank loans, trade credit and government loans. We use bank loans as the dependent variable in this study.
5
It may also be interesting to compare the Italian context with Norway, where the vast majority of firms do business with one bank only (Ongena and Smith, 2001 period. We subsequently narrowed our interest on the 286 firms which met two requirements:
they provided satisfactory accounting data; they employed no less than 5 workers in 2004 if they belonged to the service or construction sectors and no less than 10 workers if they were in manufacturing. This lower bound restriction follows the statistical definitions that are used in most government publications about the demography of firms. The entrepreneurs heading these firms were then contacted for a personal interview. 187 of these entrepreneurs made themselves available and provided adequate information.
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In generally, this survey suffers from the standards shortcomings that affect most surveys.
For instance, we cannot be sure that the respondents understood all the questions and if they did, that they answered all of them truthfully. Second, there is the problem of a non-response bias. One can never be sure that the answers of those who responded are indeed representative of the general population. Finally, since the information that we use is drawn from the successful firms, we might be victim to the survivorship bias: firms that opened during 1992-2004 but closed before the survey was conducted were not interviewed.
We have listed in Table 1 the variables we use in order to analyze the determinants of the loan structure.
6
The major source of information on the demography of Italian firms is the 'Registro delle Imprese' (Business Register), managed by the provincial Chambers of Commerce. It lists all existing firms by legal status and also includes some information about the owners and the members of their boards of directors. All new firms are required by law to register and all firms that cease to be active are de-listed.
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However, only 24 owners agreed to disclose information about the interest rates paid on their debt. Our sample includes young firms which are, on the average around 6 years old 8 . However, a few key definitions merit attention. Risk is described by the actual rate of failure of firms with five or more workers during the year before the firm was established. The presumption is that those who plan to start a new firm are informed about the actual average failure rate (which is therefore assumed to be highly correlated with the expected failure rate). Bank-customer relationship is described by the number of years during which the firm worked with its lead bank. 9 The figure was rounded in the usual way. The size of the firm is proxied by the number of employees, considered more accurate than financial measures such as sales or size of assets:
It is more difficult to under-report the number of employees than the amount of revenues.
Finally, the data regarding loans are taken from the firm's balance sheets and include all outstanding debt: spot loans, revolving credit, equipment loans, bridge loans, motor vehicle loans, capital leases. The dependent variable (LOAN) is however calculated as the ratio of loans to total assets, as in Giannetti (2003) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) . Tables 2 to 4 report the main features of the sample. Our companies are fairly small (the average number of employees is 16) and have a limited number of owners (4.7 on average, 1.5 of whom take an active role in management).
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
As noted earlier, small firms tend to rely on personal and family funds for equity, on lending from banks and on trade credit for debt. On average, equity constitutes 64% of total 8 Our definition is close to that of Phillips and Kirchhoff (1989) and Cole (2010) who Define young firms as being in operation for 5 years or less. 9
Small firms in Italy appear to be rather loyal to their lead bank.
financial resources, debt 36%. In both cases the standard deviations are almost 16%, bearing witness to the heterogeneity of firms, especially when it comes to debt. The share of equity in total funding is the highest in the transportation sector (73%), whereas manufacturing scores the highest marks in attracting outside equity funds (about 13% of total funds) and government loans (5% of total resources). 
As noted, the LOAN variable is calculated as the ratio of loans to total assets. We follow the literature by running an OLS regression on equation (1). The results are reported in Table 5 . As expected, the SIZE variable is positively correlated with the volume of loans (in relative terms):
larger new firms do tend to have a higher component of debt in their liability structure.
With regard to profitability (PRF), figures are often unreliable for a variety of reasons, including tax avoidance. We thus prefer to focus on the annual income that the owner-manager takes out from the firm. We conjecture that since retained earnings are indeed a form of financing, their presence could lessen the need to borrow. Table 5 confirms the prediction, but only in part: the coefficient is rather small and generally not significant. This could be due to 10 In other European countries only 5%-10% of all industrial start-ups have received capital contributions from third parties. the behavior of owner -managers who prefer to put money back into the firm in order to improve operations or to be able to service debt. Table 5 is the actual failure rate of firms in the three regions during the year that preceded registration. We expect this variable to be negatively associated with the role of debt: riskier firms find few lenders when they begin operations. This variable behaves in the expected way, but is not significant.
The RISK variable in
We define relationship (REL) as the number of years during which the company had "service relations" with the lead bank. These include not only borrowing relations, but also covers commercial activities such as managing a checking account. Consistent with the literature, one would expect that REL enhances the debt component of small companies. The results put forward in the first and second columns of Table 5 , however, seem to suggest that this variable has no influence on the firms' financial structure.
One might speculate that Italian banks are fast learners, or that bank-firm relationships in Italy are easier than elsewhere. Or perhaps that competition is so intense that nobody cares about relationships: "[…] firms with multiple bank relationships have more than one potential source of inside bank financing and should therefore face lower switching costs and be less susceptible to hold up threats by any one bank." (Ongena and Smith, 2001 ). Another possibility is that relationships are not linear. This hypothesis actually finds some support in column 3, where REL 2 shows the possible existence of a shift overtime.
When banks rely on relationships, the length of the relationship would reveal the trustworthiness of the borrower as the banker perceives it. Hence, in the initial period the bank deems the potential borrower as 'dangerous' and is therefore reluctant to finance him; on the other hand, when the relationship extends over a long period of time, it signals confidence and thus justifies substantial lending. This gives rise to a U-shaped relationship. During the first few years the debt share declines and over this range relationship do not help young firms. Later, when relationships have existed for several years, the "banks relationship squared" variable starts to dominate and positive links emerge.
Finally, we also make two attempts to take into account outside-equity, i.e. the funds that non-family investors add to the capital of the firm. These are usually institutional investors, such as subsidiaries of larger corporations, financial institutions and venture capitalists. Their overall contribution to the financial structure of small firms in Italy is less than 6%, but is statistically significant and seems to be a substitute for bank loans (see columns 4 and 5 in table 5).
THE IMPACT OF COLLATERAL AND INDUSTRY COMPOSITION
As observed in section 2, there are good theoretical reasons to believe that the presence of collateral does affect the interaction between small firms and banks. Thus, in this section the traditional analysis is enriched by considering two extra variables. COLL is a dummy that takes value one if the firm posts a collateral, zero otherwise. On the other hand, IND takes into account possible industrial irregularities and is equal to one for each of the industry groups listed in columns 2 to 6 in Table 6 . 
HANDLING POSSIBLE ENDOGENEITY
Although the empirical analysis put forward in the previous sections seems to generate better, more significant results than the traditional literature, it may suffer from two potential weaknesses. One regards the quality of the data, which are derived from a survey that is vulnerable to the standard problems of most surveys (see section 4). A second one relates to endogeneity, since it could be argued that loans (the dependent variable) are indeed determined by the size of the borrower, but that at the same time firms might grow larger as a result of the loans that they are able to obtain.
In order to tackle the endogeneity problem, we run two-stage least-squares regression. In the first stage we consider firm size as the dependent variable and use two capital intensive industries (manufacturing and hospitality) as instrumental variables. Table 6 shows that both variables are uncorrelated with LOAN (conditional on the other covariates), but that they are significantly and positively correlated with size, the endogenous variable. The validity of the instruments is further supported by the F and Sargan tests reported at the bottom of Table 7, where the TSLS results are detailed.
To conclude, by comparing the results of table 7 -in which the reverse causality mechanism is removed -with those of tables 5 and 6, we observe that the effect of the covariates on the volume of bank loans remains by and large the same: The risk and profitability variables work in the same direction and are still not significant. The effect of relationship is also unchanged. In particular, firm size continues to have a positive impact on the volume of bank loans and confirms the intuition that the impact is exogenous.
CONCLUSIONS
The main findings of this paper about bank lending to newly founded firms can be summarized as follows. Despite the limitations of our sample, we note that the borrowing capacity of young firms depends on their size and on the collateral their owners can offer. The role of relationship seems rather complex. The relationship variable indicates specific time related process. Once the form gets started, it generated some information that allows it to obtain credit. Later on, new information may indicate that it does not do as well as expected so the lead bank pulls back and reduces credit. As the firm ages it gets on more solid ground (if it does not fail or close) as it can demonstrate the quality of its assets--resulting in less information asymmetry and the bank increases its lending. This explanation can provide a rationale for the observed Ushaped connection between relationship and bank loan size.
More generally, this paper also shows that exploring and formulating a general theory about the determinants of capital structure in small firms remains a difficult job. Deeper study in this area is surely necessary, so as to incorporate other potentially relevant elements. For instance, future research might focus on the innovative content of the firm activities, a variable that our dataset did not allow to explore. Furthermore, not all small businesses are equally small when it comes to capital requirements: Capital-intensive firms probably need more financing and have longer time horizons than labor-intensive companies, thereby altering the bargaining power of the founder, both with potential lenders and with potential equity contributors. The dynamics of credit markets should also be taken into account, for both borrowers and lenders may alter their behavior in accordance with the monetary cycle and the institutional context (e.g. tolerable taxation, effective judiciary). 
REL
Number of years during which the firm borrows from the lead bank
RISK
Failure rate of small firms in the year prior to the establishment of the firm.
SIZE
Number of salaried employees in the firm (excluding the owner's family members) (White, 1980) t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. (White, 1980) t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates The "stars" mark significance in the usual way: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. (White, 1980) t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates The "stars" mark significance in the usual way: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
